Deed in Lieu Transactions: The Basics

John KellyWe are very pleased to have a post today from one of our colleagues here at Bean, Kinney & Korman that focuses his practice on real estate related matters, John Kelly.  We are looking forward to John's contributions here on the blog moving forward and believe John may become a regular mainstay here shortly!

Given the present economic climate, it is no surprise that many real estate developers are having difficulty paying back their lenders. The lender may agree to waive the existing defaults and restructure the loan by modifying the terms of the loan or adding additional collateral or the lender may instead proceed immediately to foreclosure. After conducting its distressed loan due diligence, however, the lender may determine that neither extreme is the right choice. Restructuring the loan may be impractical given that economic circumstances make foreclosure inevitable, but the lender may want to avoid the expense and time needed to foreclose. This post will discuss in detail the compromise position where the borrower averts foreclosure by agreeing to convey the property back to the lender via a deed-in-lieu-of-foreclosure, typically in exchange for the cancellation of the indebtedness. This will be a two part series, with the first part discussing the key aspects of a deed-in-lieu transaction, and the second part of this post will review in brief the related tax and bankruptcy issues.

The main advantage offered to both the borrower and lender is that a deed in lieu avoids the cost, time and negative stigma of a drawn-out and contested foreclosure action. For the lender, they can quickly and efficiently take over the operation of the project and preserve existing leases and contracts. For the borrower, they can obtain a release of their personal liability.

To preserve the validity of the transfer of the property to the lender, it is very important that the conveyance was made voluntarily and for adequate consideration. Lenders will want to protect themselves from the borrower later arguing that they were subject to duress, undue pressure or fraud in an effort to overturn the transaction. With regard to adequate consideration, the lender typically will not accept the conveyance unless the fair market value of the property is close to the amount of the indebtedness and the property can be obtained for less than the total cost of a foreclosure. To make clear that the transfer was voluntarily, the borrower should first submit a written offer to the lender offering to convey the property to the lender with outlining the terms and conditions of the offer. The lender should in turn reply to the borrower’s offer in writing, providing a list of conditions under which it will accept a deed in lieu. With respect to the adequacy of the consideration, the lender and borrower should self-servingly provide in an agreement that the current value of the property is equal to or less than the outstanding indebtedness. Lastly, as part of its due diligence, the lender should order an appraisal of the property, along with a title search and environmental study.

Usually, the agreement would also preserve the lender’s first lien on the property. This give the lender the right to later proceed with a regular foreclosure in order to wipe out any junior lienholders and clear title as needed. To preserve this right, the agreement should make clear the intent of the parties for the lien to remain separate even though the lender would then be the owner of the property as well as the holder of the mortgage lien. Another method of dealing with these anti-merger concerns is to have the lender take title to the property in a related entity.

Never Underestimate the Value of Face Time: Kersey v. PHH Mortgage Corporation

In 2002, Brenda Kersey received a $71,397 mortgage loan to purchase a home in Richmond, Virginia. The loan was a Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) loan governed by FHA regulations. PHH Mortgage Corporation was the holder of the note in connection with Ms. Kersey’s loan.

Like so many unfortunate homeowners, Brenda Kersey fell behind on her mortgage payments. PHH appointed the Professional Foreclosure Corporation of Virginia (“PFC”) as substitute trustee on the Deed of Trust securing the mortgage and instructed PFC to foreclose on Ms. Kersey’s home. PFC scheduled a foreclosure sale without having or attempting to arrange a face-to-face meeting between PHH and Ms. Kersey.

The deed of trust allowed foreclosure only if the holder of the note complies with FHA regulations. One of those regulations is 24 C.F.R. Section 203.604 (b), which states in part:

The mortgagee must have a face-to-face interview with the mortgagor, or make a reasonable effort to arrange such a meeting, before three full monthly installments due on the mortgage are unpaid. If default occurs in a repayment plan arranged other than during a personal interview, the mortgagee must have a face-to-face meeting with the mortgagor, or make a reasonable attempt to arrange such a meeting within 30 days after such default and at least 30 days before foreclosure is commenced….

Based on PFC’s failure to schedule a face-to-face interview before initiating foreclosure, Ms. Kersey filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Richmond City seeking a declaratory judgment that PHH failed to comply with the deed of trust sufficiently to go forward with the foreclosure. PHH removed the matter to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, and moved to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

In a memorandum opinion in Kersey v. PHH Mortgage Corporation, Judge Williams refused to dismiss Ms. Kersey’s complaint, concluding that there was a “distinct and ripe controversy” as to whether PHH owed Ms. Kersey a face-to-face interview prior to foreclosing on her home.

PHH’s first argued that Section 203.604 and the National Housing Act (“NHA”) do not grant a plaintiff a private cause of action. Judge Williams dispensed with this argument by concluding that Ms. Kersey was not bringing a claim under the NHA and Section 203.604, but rather was seeking a declaratory judgment based on a state law breach of contract claim. Interestingly, Judge Williams hinted to PHH that perhaps it could assert that Ms. Kersey’s failure to make timely payments constituted the first material breach between the parties that would have relieved PHH from the obligatory face-to-face meeting.

PHH’s second argument was that it fell under an exception found in Section 203.604 (c), that a

face-to-face meeting is not required … if [t]he mortgaged property is not within 200 miles of the mortgagee, its servicer, or a branch office of either.

PHH has loan origination branches, but no servicing branches, within 200 miles of Ms. Kersey’s property, and pointed to an interpretation of this exception on HUD’s website that Section 203.604 relates only to mortgagors living within a 200-mile radius of a servicing office. Judge Williams refused to be swayed by the interpretation on HUD’s website, finding the exception in Section 203.604 (c) to be unambiguous. According to Judge Williams, a lender could escape the face-to-face meeting requirement only if the following are not located within 200 miles of the mortgaged property:

  1. the mortgagee;
  2. the mortgagee’s mortgage servicer;
  3. a branch office of the mortgagee;
  4. a branch office of the mortgagee’s mortgage servicer.

Judge Williams found that PHH could not therefore escape its face-to-face obligation when Ms. Kersey’s complaint alleged that PHH maintains “branch offices” within 200 miles of the mortgaged property.

It will be interesting to see if PHH ultimately prevails by alleging that Ms. Kersey committed the first material breach when she fell behind on her payments.  However, stepping back from the legal analysis for a moment, maybe there is a point to these face-to-face meetings, even if they are time consuming.  In the right situation, such a meeting could enable lenders and borrowers to come up with a mutual plan to avoid painful and costly foreclosure proceedings.