Virginia Real Estate, Land Use & Construction Law : Virginia Construction Lawyers & Attorneys : Bean Kinney & Korman Law Firm : VA Real Estate, Land Use & Zoning

Can you imagine going to your local zoning office, asking for a formal determination from the Zoning Administrator as to whether you are permitted to build a building on your property, receiving a formal written determination that you may do so legally, providing the written opinion to your bank who then provides the financing, then paying for and constructing the building, only to be notified thereafter by the locality that they have either changed their mind or have decided to rezone your property without your consent in the interim?  You complain that you were told by the locality that you could build the building, but all you get is "Sorry, we've decided you can't do that after all."

Does that stick in your craw?  It should, and local officials flopping or waffling over their prior decisions happens, to some degree or another, more frequently than some might think in localities all over our Commonwealth.  Well, you can stop clearing your throat and loosening your tie because the General Assembly voted this past Monday (House 92 to 4, Senate 40 to 0) to make Zoning Administrators more accountable for the decisions they make - decisions on which private citizens must rely.  HB 1250 passed, and it modifies Section 15.2-2307 of the Code of Virginia to provide that formal determinations made by Zoning Administrators, after the requisite appeal or modification period has run, shall be considered "significant affirmative government acts" (aka "SAGAs") if a private party has relied upon a SAGA to the requisite extent.

Our colleagues at Sands Anderson down in Richmond and Beth Wellington blogged earlier this week that allowing private citizens to rely on a formal opinion by the Zoning Administrator (that person holding the statutorily designated office to make such determinations), might somehow allow private property owners to rezone their property "in the dark," or gain some other advantage outside of the public eye.  Yes, it is true that a Zoning Administrator has the sole authority to make a formal, binding determination of what a parcel of land's current zoning classification allows; however, that is in fact the total extent of that authority.  A Zoning Administrator may not grant, through a formal determination, additional rights to use land beyond what is permitted by its current zoning classification. 

The other concerns raised about the bill seem to relate to lack of public notice to other potentially interested parties that such a SAGA is being made (i.e. a Zoning Administrator may issue a formal determination to a property owner without giving other potentially interested parties any notice).  What if you are a co-owner not reflected in any public record, a lender, or an adjoining property owner that would be affected detrimentally by an incorrect determination?  You would have no way of knowing that a determination had been made and that the clock on your appeal window is ticking away.   In fact, realistically, it is very unlikely you would know anything until your appeal period had lapsed (typically only 30 to 60 days, depending on the facts).

Some of the other statutorily listed SAGAs require some kind of legally advertised public review process; however, these are only those SAGAs that are the culmination of processes that allow property owners to do things beyond what they may do by-right, such as variances, special exceptions, etc.  Other by-right SAGAs do not require public review, such as subdivision approvals, plans of development, etc.  Clearly, a zoning determination may not permit something illegal, but who would know until it was too late?  Are we heading toward publishing legal notices that a zoning determination has been made?  How would this jibe with the "A Thing Decided Doctrine" relating to oral determinations made by Zoning Administrators?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In 2002, Brenda Kersey received a $71,397 mortgage loan to purchase a home in Richmond, Virginia. The loan was a Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) loan governed by FHA regulations. PHH Mortgage Corporation was the holder of the note in connection with Ms. Kersey’s loan.

Like so many unfortunate homeowners, Brenda Kersey fell behind on her mortgage payments. PHH appointed the Professional Foreclosure Corporation of Virginia (“PFC”) as substitute trustee on the Deed of Trust securing the mortgage and instructed PFC to foreclose on Ms. Kersey’s home. PFC scheduled a foreclosure sale without having or attempting to arrange a face-to-face meeting between PHH and Ms. Kersey.

The deed of trust allowed foreclosure only if the holder of the note complies with FHA regulations. One of those regulations is 24 C.F.R. Section 203.604 (b), which states in part:

The mortgagee must have a face-to-face interview with the mortgagor, or make a reasonable effort to arrange such a meeting, before three full monthly installments due on the mortgage are unpaid. If default occurs in a repayment plan arranged other than during a personal interview, the mortgagee must have a face-to-face meeting with the mortgagor, or make a reasonable attempt to arrange such a meeting within 30 days after such default and at least 30 days before foreclosure is commenced….

Based on PFC’s failure to schedule a face-to-face interview before initiating foreclosure, Ms. Kersey filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Richmond City seeking a declaratory judgment that PHH failed to comply with the deed of trust sufficiently to go forward with the foreclosure. PHH removed the matter to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, and moved to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

In a memorandum opinion in Kersey v. PHH Mortgage Corporation, Judge Williams refused to dismiss Ms. Kersey’s complaint, concluding that there was a “distinct and ripe controversy” as to whether PHH owed Ms. Kersey a face-to-face interview prior to foreclosing on her home.

PHH’s first argued that Section 203.604 and the National Housing Act (“NHA”) do not grant a plaintiff a private cause of action. Judge Williams dispensed with this argument by concluding that Ms. Kersey was not bringing a claim under the NHA and Section 203.604, but rather was seeking a declaratory judgment based on a state law breach of contract claim. Interestingly, Judge Williams hinted to PHH that perhaps it could assert that Ms. Kersey’s failure to make timely payments constituted the first material breach between the parties that would have relieved PHH from the obligatory face-to-face meeting.

PHH’s second argument was that it fell under an exception found in Section 203.604 (c), that a

face-to-face meeting is not required … if [t]he mortgaged property is not within 200 miles of the mortgagee, its servicer, or a branch office of either.

PHH has loan origination branches, but no servicing branches, within 200 miles of Ms. Kersey’s property, and pointed to an interpretation of this exception on HUD’s website that Section 203.604 relates only to mortgagors living within a 200-mile radius of a servicing office. Judge Williams refused to be swayed by the interpretation on HUD’s website, finding the exception in Section 203.604 (c) to be unambiguous. According to Judge Williams, a lender could escape the face-to-face meeting requirement only if the following are not located within 200 miles of the mortgaged property:

1. the mortgagee;
2. the mortgagee’s mortgage servicer;
3. a branch office of the mortgagee;
4. a branch office of the mortgagee’s mortgage servicer.

Judge Williams found that PHH could not therefore escape its face-to-face obligation when Ms. Kersey’s complaint alleged that PHH maintains “branch offices” within 200 miles of the mortgaged property.

It will be interesting to see if PHH ultimately prevails by alleging that Ms. Kersey committed the first material breach when she fell behind on her payments.  However, stepping back from the legal analysis for a moment, maybe there is a point to these face-to-face meetings, even if they are time consuming.  In the right situation, such a meeting could enable lenders and borrowers to come up with a mutual plan to avoid painful and costly foreclosure proceedings. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (4)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Supreme Court of Virginia issued an opinion last Friday in the case of Virginia Home for Boys and Girls v. Phillips  that reads like a law school examination question.  The court ruled that a man had no claim against an estate because he had no written contract and no independent verification.  

The basic principles are easy.  The statute of frauds in Virginia generally provides that all contracts for the sale of real estate must be in writing.  The so-called "Dead Man's Statute" provides that in cases where the opponent is incapable of testifying, no judgment shall be rendered if it is founded solely on uncorroborated testimony.  Both of these statutes make it incredibly difficult for a party to make a claim against an estate based on oral contracts, particularly claims involving real estate.

Despite these principles, the claimant in this case actually won at the trial court.  Part performance of the agreement can eliminate the requirement for a written contract.  Phillips claimed an agreement in 1977 that the estate should go to him if he helped on their farm and took over their operations.  The trial court was convinced based on the long history of changes in lifestyle, decades of assistance around the decedent's farm, and refusing to take more lucrative jobs in order to live by his agreement that Phillips story was on the level.  Unfortunately for Phillips, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and found there was no independent corroboration.

This case provides a couple important take-aways:

• All contracts involving real estate should be in writing
• Do not expect limited exceptions to basic rules to save your case, especially in Virginia
• Any arrangements that are effective upon death should be confirmed in writing
• Any business ownership transfer issues should be in writing or you risk estate planning arrangments trumping the oral business deal

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Andrew McRoberts reported on Thursday that the Virginia Association of Counties released its Model Transfer of Development Rights Ordinance for Virginia Localities.  Andrew was part of a working group that worked with a number of stakeholders to develop this model ordinance so that it may be used as a guide for localities in Virginia unfamiliar with the concept, application and practice of using transferable development rights, or "TDRs."

TDRs have been used in various places throughout the country for some time now.  Even in Virginia, the County Manager form of Government (as is the case in Arlington County), has been permitted to allow TDRs in its zoning ordinance since 2005.  In a nutshell, TDRs are simply the right to separate the density from one site and convey the density to another site.  This is typically done by identifying which sites can be a "sending site" or a "receiving site" in a locality's comprehensive plan and/or its zoning ordinance.  In Arlington County, for instance, TDRs have been implemented vis-a-vis its unique special exception process (the 4.1 Site Plan Process), and have also been enabled for its Clarendon Sector Plan.

TDRs are an excellent tool which provide useful flexibility for both localities and private interests.  This tool can allow localities to preserve important historical sites and other sites of interest while still allowing private landowners to sell the density off of a site, thus preserving their property rights. It also lets localities encourage redevelopment in areas that don't need extra height or density without having to provide valuable incentives that might otherwise cost localities money (i.e. tax credits, etc.).

The Model Transfer of Development Rights Ordinance for Virginia Localities was drafted to reflect the 2009 updates to Code of Virginia Sections 15.2-2316.1 and 15.2-2316.2, which "...[allow] severance of development rights without their immediate reattachment to another property... [and] provide for local taxation of the severed rights as a separate property interest during the time they are unattached to a specific land parcel."  The model provides example ordinance provisions and definitions, explanatory commentary for the model provisions, and even model legal documents for use when transferring density. 

Being able to transfer density has lead to some pretty interesting transactions and land use/zoning solutions for us here at Bean Kinney, and I am excited to see this very useful tool implemented in other localities in the Commonwealth.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

With the General Assembly set to convene and prefiling ending on January 13th, I thought it would be worth while to take a look at the legislative proposals submitted thus far to see if anything  jumped out at me this year from the land use side of things.  Suprisingly, this session looks kind of light so far (everyone must be focusing on the budget bills...).

From the local government side, it looks like HB 33 proposes requiring additional disclosures by local governments when seeking bond approvals from voters.  It appears the idea is that public notices would have to include not only the amount of debt to be assumed, but now also the anticipated number of years to amortize and the total debt service payable on the principal amount of the bonds proposed to be issued.  More information for voters - how can you vote against this one?

Also, HB 51 proposes to allow localities' governing bodies the option to prepare their own amendments to comprehensive plans rather than having to request the local planning commission to do so.  HJ 11 proposes the necessary constitutional amendment to allow localities to establish their own income or financial worth limitations for granting local property tax relief to seniors (65 year-olds) and permanently disabled individuals.

On the transportation side, it looks like this will be a season of transportation reform.  The big one, HJ 5, according to LIS, proposes an amendment to the Constitution of Virginia to require the General Assembly to maintain permanent and separate Transportation Funds, that revenues dedicated to Transportation Funds actually have to be deposited into the Transportation Funds, and limits the use of Transportation Funds to only transportation related purposes, unless the General Assembly secures a 2/3 plus one majority to borrow from the Transportation Funds.  Borrowed funds would have to be repayed, with interest, within a specified period of time.

Transportation programs are also proposed to now be subject to performance audits by the Auditor of Public Accounts per HB 42.  These audits would include cost saving assessments, and organizational structure/efficiency and effectiveness analysis of transportation agencies by private management consulting firms.

Also, HB 25 proposes to amend the requirements of the Statewide Transportation Plan, and for evaluation of selection of transportation improvement projects, to include as an objective identifying quantifiable measures and achievable goals relating to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  HB 55 puts forward limiting assessments on localities for VRE service to no more than a locality collects through its motor vehicle fuel sales tax while HB 19 attempts to allow the Potomac-Rappahannock Transportation Commission to charge higher fares to VRE passengers from localities who are not that are not embraced by the Potomac-Rappahannock Transportation District.

And finally, from the conflicts of interest camp, members of the General Assembly, per SB 4, would have to disclose any money paid to him/her, or immediate family, in excess of $10,000 by a state or local government or advisory agency.  Former Section 30-111 explicitly allowed members and their family members to exclude what they were paid by various governmental agencies/commissions on their Statement of Economic Interest conflict of interest disclosure form.  I wonder why?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (4)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In 2004, 515 Granby, LLC proposed a $180.5 million condo development. With 34 stories and 327 units, Granby Towers would be the tallest building in Norfolk and would revitalize the northern part of the city. The following year, the federal government threatened to condemn the property, causing just enough of a delay for the ebbing economic tide to overtake the Granby Tower project and thwart 515 Granby’s ability to secure financing.

Fortunately for 515 Granby, the prime contract with Turner Construction Company had the following language:

This Agreement and any liability and obligations of the Owner…shall be subject to and expressly conditioned upon the closing by the Owner, and the initial funding by its lender, of the construction loan… and Owner shall have no obligation or liability to Construction Manager for any costs for the Construction Phase under this Agreement unless such construction loan closing is completed.

Turner and its subcontractors, who were owed over $13 million for construction on the project, challenged this language in a two-day evidentiary hearing in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk. In a letter opinion issued by Judge Martin, Judge Martin rejected this challenge, finding that 515 Granby “made great efforts to secure financing for the project,” but was unable to do so due to the current conditions of the credit market. Judge Martin concluded that 515 Granby would have had to pay Turner only if and when it had received initial funding of the construction loan.  For an in-depth look at the court's reasoning, and what you can do if you face such a contractual provision, go to Yes, Virginia, Contract Terms Do Matter:  Financing Term Offers Owner an Escape Hatch, by my colleague, Tim Hughes, guest blogging on Construction Law Musings. 

Fortunately for Turner, its subcontracts contained the following language:

The obligation of Turner to make a payment under this Agreement, whether a progress or final payment, or for extras or change orders or delays to the Work, is subject to the express condition precedent of payment therefor by the Owner.

One of the subcontractors, Suburban Grading & Utilities, claimed this language was unenforceable. In a second letter opinion, Judge Martin upheld this provision as well, noting that the Supreme Court of Virginia finds “pay if paid” clauses enforceable “where the language of the contract in question is clear on its face.” This language was an unambiguous “pay if paid” clause that Judge Martin had no choice but to uphold, leaving Suburban to eat the costs of $575,928 for labor and materials and another $245,662 for dewatering.  For a great and very timely discussion of this opinion and advice about "pay if paid" clauses, I urge you to read Chris Hill's Construction Law Musings post, Pay if Paid, Pay Attention Subs.

Don’t go away thinking there will be no winners in this debacle! The federal government has since conveniently renewed its desire to condemn the property in order to expand the federal courthouse next door.  It offered a paltry $6.1 million to seize the Granby Tower property, an offer that no one is jumping at yet.  If you’re interested in reading more on this very likely end to the Granby Towers saga, take a look at Harry Minium and Tim McGlone’s recent article in The Virginian-Pilot.  
 

Image by:  Hyunsoo Leo Kim/The Virginian-Pilot 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (10)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In the recent case of Burdette v. Brush Mountain Estates, LLC, the Virginia Supreme Court tackled head on what it takes to convey an easement. Burdette acquired two parcels of land by deed, which stated that the conveyance was “made subject to all easements, reservations, restrictions and conditions of record affecting the hereinabove described property,” and referred to a boundary line adjustment plat that was recorded in the land records. The plat depicted a fifty-foot easement traversing both parcels and this notation” ‘50’ PRIVATE EASEMENT FOR INGRESS, EGRESS AND PUBLIC UTILITY FOR THE BENEFIT OF [Brush Mountain’s property], IS HEREBY CONVEYED.”

Brush Mountain owned an adjacent parcel to the east of Burdette’s property. Brush Mountain submitted a request to rezone its parcel. To develop its property, Brush Mountain would need to rely on the easement for access. When Burdette discovered Brush Mountain’s plans, Burdette filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Brush Mountain, contesting the existence of the easement.

In analyzing whether an easement must be conveyed by a deed or will, the Court began with Virginia Code Section 55-2, which states “No estate of inheritance or freehold or for a term of more than five years in lands shall be conveyed unless by deed or will.” In holding that an easement is not an estate in land, the Court concluded that Section 55-2 was not applicable.

The Court then turned to the language in the deeds and the plat, siding with Burdette that those documents did not contain the necessary words to convey an easement. First, the “subject to” language in the deed was merely boiler plate and did not specify a particular plat. Second, the plat did not show the full extent of the burden imposed by the easement because the easement spilled over into property not included in the survey and was identified only in a note. Third, Brush Mountain was in essence a stranger to the deeds.

The moral of the story is that, if you want to convey an easement, be as clear as possible about your intent. Details matter! Specify the plat directly on the face of the deed. Incorporate the plat, and show the full extent of the easement on the plat. And include all related parties in the deed.
 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In case you missed it, Arlington County's Rosslyn-Ballston corridor made the NY Times on Thursday.  The article, entitled "An Oasis of Stability Amid a Downturn", provides how well Arlington County is weathering the current real estate market as compared to other locations of the country.   The article cites Arlington's 8.6% office vacancy rate against the national average of 18.3% (and the second lowest retail vacancy rate out of the 23 major markets surveyed), and attributes these relatively low vacancy rates to the corridor's well-planned, transit-oriented mix of uses and proximity to the nation's capitol, public transit/Metro system, and the County's ability to attract and retain a number of federal agencies and universities in the County.

It is true that the major key to Arlington's success has been its proximity to the federal government, and that it is a natural location for expansion of density outside of the District of Columbia (Arlington actually being originally planned as part of DC), but it is great to read about the truly excellent foresight the County has exercised over the years to ensure this potential was not lost and directed to other localities in the region.  Arlington really is a unique market that deserves special attention, particularly during economic downturns.  In fact, Arlington experienced similar resilience during the Great Depression.

I am very happy to see Arlington get the recognition it deserves.  One quote hit the nail on the head: "'[t]here’s a lot of tremendous economic fundamentals in place' in the corridor..." 

And to top it all off, Virginia was just named the "Best State for Business" by Forbes.com. for the fourth year in a row.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A quick “congrats” to Jim Pritchett who has been named Executive Director of Alexandria’s relatively new Housing Development Corporation. The Alexandria Housing Development Corporation (AHDC) is a non-profit developer and owner of affordable housing, primarily focused on projects located in the City of Alexandria, Virginia. 

The creation of AHDC was pursuant to a request from then-Councilman William Euille and Councilwoman Joyce Woodson to Alexandria city staff for a plan of action to address the City's affordable housing needs.  In April of 2003, Mildrilyn Davis, Director of the Office of Housing, and Phil Sunderland, City Manager, responded with a memorandum detailing the establishment of a new non-profit housing corporation. This plan anticipated city involvement in the creation and initial establishment of the corporation, but without direct oversight of its activities.  In January of 2004, the City Council named five incorporators to form the corporation and oversee its initial setup and AHDC was incorporated in May of that same year. 

AHDC is preparing to celebrate the Grand Opening of The Station at Potomac Yard on October 17th.  This unique project is a mixed use development that includes 64 units of affordable and workforce housing, Alexandria's newest fire station, and some retail space that is available on the first floor. 

Good luck to Jim and the rest of the AHDC team.

For more information about this project and AHDC here’s the link to their website.

Thanks to Larry Adams, the project's architect from LeMay Erickson, for allowing us to post the above rendering.  Here's a link to the architect's website:  LeMay Erickson Willcox Architects

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As the economy has languished, many property sellers and landlords have experienced extensions of property listings. In many cases, these extensions have actually exceeded the terms of the listing agreements with their brokers. This situation can raise some complex questions of exactly what listing terms remain in place and what commission, if any, the real estate broker can recover.

A recent case in the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, Grubb & Ellis v.  Potomac Medical Building, LLC, gives some guidance on these questions. The case ended in a bench trial and resulting forty page memorandum opinion, so the case is certainly long on facts and detail. There are a few important take-away points, especially when one takes into account the context of litigation in the "Rocket Docket":

• The original listing agreement permitted only written extensions - while there were continued dealings between the parties, the court found there was no extension of the original listing in large part because there was no written extension
  
• The broker’s continuing efforts to lease the property did not create a new listing agreement
• While the initial broker brought the eventual tenant to the table, that tenant was not willing to close on the landlord's terms so the broker was not the "procuring cause"

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link